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Pedro A. Malavet 
"The Constitution Follows 
the Flag ... but Doesn't 
Quite Catch Up with It"!: The 
Story 01 Downes v. Bidwell 
Introduction 
The May 27, 1901 ruling of the United States Supreme Court in 
Downes v. Bidwell,2 particularly Justice Edward Douglass White's opin-
ion,3 is today the most important of the Insular Cases. With the U.S. 
Armed Forces facing insurgency in the Philippines and political wran-
gling in Cuba and Puerto Rico following the Spanish American War, the 
policy motivations for the result in this case were straightforward. The 
United States was becoming a world power, which, at the turn of the 
twentieth century, meant becoming an imperial nation capable of hold-
ing colonies on which to establish military bases all over the world.4 
1 This is the quoted response of then Secretary of War Elihu Root when-after hearing 
a reading of the five opinions of the Supreme Court in the Downes case-confused 
reporters asked how the Justices had replied to the question "Does the constitution follow 
the flag?" See George Shiras III, Justice George Shiras, Jr. of Pittsburgh 191 (Winfield 
Shiras ed., 1953) (citing 1 Arthur Wallace Dunn, From Harrison to Harding 256-57 
(1922)). 
2182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
3 ld. at 287-344 (White, J., concurring). 
4 See generally Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made 
Their Country a World Power 8 (2002) ("John Hay, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, Elihu Root, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt can fairly be called the fathers of modern 
American imperialism and the men who set the United States on the road to becoming a 
great power."). 
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112 THE STORY OF DOWNES v. BIDWELL 
Downes effectively provides constitutional authorization for this process 
by interpreting Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, the 
Territorial Clause, to give Congress almost unfettered authority to deal 
with territorial possessions. 
The Territorial Clause provides: 
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution 
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any claims of the United States, 
or of any particular state.5 
Initially, this clause was applied to most of the thirty-seven territo-
ries that became states after the original thirteen colonies.6 For example, 
Alaska and Hawai'i were at one time regulated by legislation passed by 
Congress, but that legislation was repealed or became obsolete after 
statehood.7 Today, the clause applies to Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
Guam, the Northern Marianas, American Samoa, the Federated States 
of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.s Statutes passed under 
the authority of the Territorial Clause refer to these areas not as 
"territories," but rather as "possessions," "insular possessions," or 
"insular areas.,,9 Pursuant to these statutes, the United States controls 
5 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
6 Texas, which, from the American perspective, seceded from Mexico and became a 
state after being an "independent Republic," is a possible exception. For a succinct 
distinction between the continental territories and the island territories, see Arnold H. 
Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Rela-
tions 4-16 (1989). 
7 As to Alaska, see 48 U.S.C. §§ 21-488f (2003). Alaska was officially admitted to 
statehood on January 6, 1959. See Proclamation No. 3269, 24 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 6, 1959); 
Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339. As to Hawai'i, see 48 U.S.C. §§ 611-
21 (2003). Hawai'i was admitted by law as of March 18, 1959. See Act of Mar. 18, 1959, 
Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959). Section 2 of this law provided for the new state to 
include 
Id. 
all the islands, together with their appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, included in 
the Territory of Hawai'i on the date of enactment of this Act, except the atoll known 
as Palmyra Island, together with its appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, but said 
State shall not be deemed to include the Midway Islands, Johnston Island, Sand Island 
(offshore from Johnston Island), or Kingman Reef, together with their appurtenant 
reefs and territorial waters. 
S Leibowitz, supra note 6, at 3. 
9 See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 731, et seq. (2003) (title named "Territories and Insular 
Possessions"). The Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Mfairs currently defines 
the term "insular area" as follows: 
A jurisdiction that is neither a part of one of the several States nor a Federal district. 
This is the current generic term to refer to any commonwealth, freely associated state, 
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or has a legal relationship with these eight populated island territories 
and controls several unpopulated islands.10 The populated territories 
collectively have well over four million residents,!1 and among this group, 
the Samoans, as well as the residents of the three so-called Free 
Associated States-Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau-are not 
citizens of the United States.12 
Some may consider a 1901 case to be ancient history, but Downes 
and its progeny still govern all of these regionsY This chapter will 
possession or territory or Territory and from July 18, 1947, until October 1, 1994, the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Unmodified, it may refer not only to a 
jurisdiction which is under United States sovereignty but also to one which is not, i.e., 
a freely associated state or, 1947-94, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or one 
of the districts of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 
Office of Insular Affairs, Dep't of the Interior, Definitions of Insular Area Political 
Organizations, at http://www.doi.gov/oia/lslandpages/politicaLtypes.htm (last visited Aug. 
27,2006). 
10 In its "Island Fact Sheet," the Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs 
identifies the unpopulated island territories of the United States under two designated 
categories: "United States Territories under the Jurisdiction of OIA," which includes Wake 
Atoll and certain areas of the Palmyra Atoll, and "U.S. Territories under the Jurisdiction 
of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service," which includes Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis 
Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Navassa Island, and most of Palmyra Atoll, often 
referred to together as the Guano Islands. Office of Insular Affairs, Dep't of the Interior, 
The Islands, at http://www.doi.gov/oia/Firstpginfo/islandfactsheet.htm (last visited Febru-
ary 4, 2007); see generally Leibowitz, supra note 6, at 3 (a listing of the current U.S. 
territorial possessions). On the Guano Islands, see Guano Islands Act of 1856, ch. 164, § 1, 
11 Stat. 119 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1411 (2003)) ("Whenever any citizen of the United 
States discovers a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful 
jurisdiction of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other 
government, and takes peaceable possession thereof, and occupies the same, such island, 
rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the 
United States.") 
11 The Puerto Rican population of close to four million, as discussed below in note 15 
and accompanying text, far exceeds the populations of other island territories, which the 
2000 Census found were as follows: American Samoa, 57,291; Guam, 154,805; the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, 108,612; and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 62,221. 
U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, The Island Areas, at http://www.census. 
gov/population/www/cen2000/islandareas.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2006). 
12 Leibowitz, supra note 6, at 449-51 (expressing some doubt about the matter, but 
noting that American Samoans are treated as "non-citizen nationals" of the United 
States). The three so-called Free Associated States (the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau) are members of the United Nations with 
their own citizenship, independent from the United States. The Federated States of 
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands were admitted on September 17, 1991, and Palau was 
admitted on December 15, 1994. See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., United 
Nations Member States, U.N. Doc. ORG/1469 (July 3, 2006), available at http://www.un. 
org/News/Press/docs/2006/org1469.doc.htm; see generally Leibowitz, supra note 6, at 639-
703 (detailing the legal relationship between these three island and the United States). 
13 See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); see also Margaret Leech, In the 
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explore the Insular Cases as a way to understand the role of race in 
articulating the relationship between American territorial expansion and 
American citizenship-between American empire and American democ-
racy. The chapter begins by historicizing the Downes opinion. My aim 
here is threefold: (1) to provide a brief description of the effects of 
Spanish colonial rule on Puerto Rico; (2) to set forth the circumstances 
leading up to the Spanish American War; and (3) to illustrate how the 
outcome of that war helped to shape America's identity as a colonial 
power. Next, the chapter tells the story behind the Downes opinion itself, 
showing how the law reflected an uneasy balance between declaring the 
island to be both a U.S. possession, and one with a separate, not entirely 
"American" population. As this story and its aftermath will reveal, 
Downes and other early cases made clear that Puerto Rico did not enjoy 
the same status as states when it came to matters of commerce and 
trade. Because Congress exercised plenary power over the insular posses-
sions, it could impose tariffs and taxes similar to those levied on foreign 
countries. A later generation of Insular Cases used Puerto Rico's sepa-
rate and subordinate status to relegate its residents to second-class 
citizenship. Yet another generation of decisions make clear that the 
doctrine first set forth in Downes and elaborated in these later opinions 
remains good law today. The resiliency of decisions that signaled the rise 
of the United States as an imperial power is then explained by turning to 
the normative ideas about race, citizenship, and empire that lay behind 
the Insular Cases. 
Social, Historical, and Legal Context: 
Our Islands and Their People14 
The Downes case arose because Puerto Rico, a Spanish colony for 
over 400 years, had just been acquired by the United States as part of 
the spoils of war. Shortly before the war, Puerto Rico had enjoyed 
newfound autonomy under Spanish rule, and its residents expected that 
the American takeover would eventually lead to statehood or indepen-
dence. As Downes and its progeny would make clear, however, U.S. 
officials devised a new model for insular possessions, one of territorial 
acquisition but only partial political incorporation. 
Puerto Rico in 1901: Self-Government and Spanish Citizenship 
that Did Not Last Long 
Puerto Rico is a group of islands bordered by the Atlantic Ocean and 
Caribbean Sea, the main island of which is the home to all but a few 
Days of McKinley (reprint ed., Am. Political Biography Press 1999). 
14 Jose de Olivares, Our Islands and Their People as Seen with Camera and Pencil 
(William S. Bryan Wheeler ed., 1899) is a large two-volume coffee-table book set, which was 
sold door-to-door after the war, purportedly describing the new island territories. 
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thousand of the inhabitants. Puerto Rico is the most populous of the 
current island territories of the United States, with estimates in 2006 
placing the number of residents at 3,927,188; perhaps not surprisingly, 
then, Puerto· Rico figures prominently in most of the Insular Cases.15 
Because U.S. citizens have not moved to Puerto Rico in substantial 
numbers, Puerto Rico remains a culturally Latina/o island, even after 
more than one hundred years of U.S. occupation. 16 Additionally, a 
number of Puerto Ricans have migrated to the mainland. The 2000 
Census found 3,406,178 persons in the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia who identified themselves as "Hispanic or Latino," specifically 
"Puerto Rican," making Puerto Ricans one of the largest Latina/o 
groups in the United States.17 
For about five centuries before Christopher Columbus claimed the 
territory for Spain in 1493, Taino and Carib natives lived on the Puerto 
Rican islands. But the Spanish colonial period lasted for a little more 
than four centuries, during which period the people we now refer to as 
Puerto Ricans were-through racial, legal, political, and cultural process-
es-created.18 On the eve of the Spanish American War in 1898, Puerto 
Rico and Cuba were the last outposts of Spain in the Americas. Mexico 
(the viceroyalty of New Spain) and Central America (the captaincy of 
Guatemala) became independent in 1821 in the aftermath of the N apole-
onic invasion of Spain. Three years later, the Battle of Ayacucho in the 
Andes marked the end of the wars of independence in South America.19 
15 According to the 2000 Census, Puerto Rico's population was 3,808,610. U.S. Census 
Bureau, United States Census 2000, Census 2000 Data for Puerto Rico, at http://www.cen 
sus.gov/census2000/states/pr.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2006). The Central Intelligence 
Agency estimated that as of July 2006, Puerto Rico's population had risen to 3,927,188. 
CIA, The World Factbook, Puerto Rico, at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
geos/rq.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2006). 
16 According to the 2000 U.S. Census 98.8% of Puerto Rican citizens describe them-
selves as "Hispanic or Latino" and 95.1% as "Puerto Rican." U.S. Census Bureau, Profile 
of the General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, Geographic Area: Puerto Rico, at http:// 
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTableLbm=y & -geo.J.d=04000US72 & -qrJlame=DEC_ 
2000_SFLU_DP1 & -ds_name=DEC_2000_SFLU (last visited Aug. 27, 2006). 
17 U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic or Latino by Type: 2000, at http://factfinder.census. 
gov/serv let/QT TableLbm=y & -qLname=DEC_2000_SFLU_QTP9 & -geo.J.d=01000US 
& -ds_name=DEC_2000_SFLU & -redoLog=false (last visited Aug. 27, 2006). 
18 See generally Pedro A. Malavet, America's Colony: The Political and Cultural 
Conflict Between the United States and Puerto Rico 49-116 (2004) (chapters detailing 
Puerto Rico's culture from political and sociological perspectives). 
19 The Spanish empire in the Americas was almost totally lost between 1821 and 1824, 
though Cuba and Puerto Rico were still under Spanish control. See Jose Terrero, Historia 
de Espana 456-58 (Juan Regia ed., 1972). 
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In a process that had started with the revolution of September 1868 
in Spain and continued with the new constitution of 1876,20 the Spanish 
crown began to reconsider the legal regime governing the islands of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. Article 89 of the Constitution of the Spanish 
Monarchy of 1876 gave the government the power to issue special 
legislation for the governance of the ''provincias de ultramar" (the 
overseas provinces). Clause 2 gave Cuba and Puerto Rico the right to be 
represented in the Cortes-the Spanish legislative body-once special 
laws to that effect were enacted. Over the next few years, Spain granted 
Cuba and Puerto Rico increasing levels of home rule. Due to political 
turmoil in Spain, however, this constitutional authorization was not 
implemented in earnest until 1897.21 On November 25, 1897, Spain 
enacted the Charter of Autonomy for Puerto Rico. The charter granted 
self-government by an elected lower chamber of the legislature, a partial-
ly elected and partially appointed upper legislative chamber, and an 
appointed high executive, known as the governor-genera1.22 As part of 
the autonomy process, Spanish citizenship was formally granted to the 
native-born inhabitants of Cuba and Puerto Rico that same month.23 A 
separate decree extended the civil rights guarantees of the 1876 Spanish 
constitution to Puerto Rico.24 These reforms were designed to calm civil 
unrest on the island. For example, in the late 1890s, Luis Munoz-Rivera, 
the leader of Puerto Rico's principal political group, the Autonomist 
Party, rejected plans for a military attack against the Spanish proposed 
by Puerto Rican pro-independence forces in exile in New York.25 
The Charter of Autonomy set the stage for the final Spanish election 
in Puerto Rico. On March 27, 1898, 121,573 voters went to the polls. On 
20 See Constituciones y C6digos Politicos Espafwles 1801-1978, 145 (Julio Montero-
Dfaz ed., 1998). 
21 Puerto Rico: Leyes Fundamentales 9-114 (Alfonso L. Garda-Martinez ed., 1989) 
[hereinafter Leyes Fundamentales]. 
22 See Tit. I, art. 2, of the Charter of Autonomy, in "Historical Documents," in 1 
Puerto Rico Laws Annotated 16 (Lexis Publishing Puerto Rico, 1999). In order to avoid 
confusion with the numbering of the laws themselves, I use P.R. Laws Ann., vol. 1, p. xx 
when citing specific pages in this important historical volume of the Puerto Rico Laws 
Annotated, which transcribes in English many fundamental laws and historical documents 
that are essential to the discussion in this chapter. However, when citing Puerto Rican 
laws generally, I provide the legal citation for the statutes by using the abbreviation P.R. 
Laws Ann. followed by the appropriate title and section. 
23 Article 1 of the Decree of 9 November 1897 gave Spanish citizenship, on an equal 
footing with residents of the Peninsula, to the Spanish subjects in the Antilles. See Leyes 
Fundamentales, supra note 21, at 93. 
24 See Jose Trfas Monge, 1 Historia Constitucional de Puerto Rico 128 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Historia ConstitucionalJ. 
25 Olga Jimenez de Wagenheim, Puerto Rico: An Interpretative History from Pre-
Columbian Times to 1900 at 198-99 (1998). 
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July 17, 1898, the new local government was installed.26 Puerto Rico's 
Autonomist and Liberal Parties welcomed the charter and elected the 
country's first homegrown government just weeks before the start of the 
Spanish American War.27 But the Charter of Autonomy still proved 
unacceptable to the more stridently pro-independence Puerto Ricans in 
New York, some of whom encouraged the United States to invade. After 
Autonomist leaders in Puerto Rico rejected the call for revolution against 
Spain, officers of the Puerto Rico Section, a pro-independence group 
originally founded by exiles in 1892 as the Borinquen Club, met with 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in 1898 to ask the "United States govern-
ment for help in evicting Spain from Puerto Rico.,,28 The pro-indepen-
dence puertorriqueiias/os in New York even provided interpreters and 
scouts for the U.S. Army. To be sure, many believed that the United 
States would quickly give Puerto Rico independence after the invasion, 
as would happen in Cuba. What pro-independence forces clearly underes-
timated in both Puerto Rico and Cuba was how disruptive America's 
imperial dreams would be for these islands. The concerns expressed by 
some Puerto Rican leaders were largely ignored. For example, Ramon 
Emeterio Betances worried that "if Puerto Ricans don't act fast after the 
Americans invade, the island will be an American colony forever. ,,29 
And indeed, in July 1898, the americanos invaded, and the Auto-
nomist experiment ended before Puerto Rico had a real chance, however 
limited, to rule itself. Nevertheless, native political thinking and organiz-
ing had developed greatly during the nineteenth century, and when 
Americans arrived in Puerto Rico, they found sophisticated politicians 
and parties ready to support, challenge, and oppose the new sovereign. 
Between September 1898 and April 12, 1900-following the quick 
American victory in the war-Puerto Rico was under military rule, 
supervised by the War Department.3o During this period, the "partidas," 
26 See Fernando Bayron Toro, Elecciones y Partidos Politicos de Puerto Rico 129-39 
(4th ed. 1989). 
27 It was an imperfect form of home rule, as the Spaniards retained the authority to 
appoint certain members of the upper chamber of the legislature and to set the eligibility 
requirements, which ensured that only the economically powerful classes would be allowed 
to run for office. The law required that candidates for office have "an annual income of 
four thousand pesos." Tit. III, art. 5 & 6 of the charter, P.R. Laws Ann., vol. 1, pp. 2-3. See 
Pedro Malavet-Vega, Historia de la Canci6n Popular en Puerto Rico: 1493-1898 at 293, 
351, 448-49, 505-08 (1992) (explaining the income situation in Puerto Rico at the time). 
On the monetary units in Spanish times, see Fernando Pica, Historia General de Puerto 
Rico 9 (1986). 
28 Jimenez de Wagenheim, supra note 25, at 198-199. 
29 See id. at 200. 
30 See generally Raul Serrano Geyls, 1 Derecho Constitucional de Estados Unidos y 
Puerto Rico 439-42 (1986) (describing the legal aspects of this early period of military rule); 
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well-organized mobs, fought in the mountains of Puerto Rico. This 
guerrilla class-warfare began with the poor attacking the Spaniards but 
quickly extended to attacks on wealthy criollaslos (creoles).31 The targets 
were mostly white mallorquines (Majorcans) and corsos (Corsicans) who 
owned coffee plantations and, thus, controlled what was then the most 
powerful part of the island economy. These were the same immigrants 
who arrived after Spain opened Puerto Rico and Cuba to those fleeing 
the wars of independence in the Spanish Americas. At the expense of the 
Puerto Rican poor, the U.S. military restored "order" and earned the 
gratitude and allegiance of some of the Puerto Rican elites.32 
Soon after the change in sovereignty, the former Pure and Orthodox 
Party became the pro-statehood Partido Republicano Puertorriqueno 
(Puerto Rican Republican Party). The party's goal was "the definitive 
and sincere annexation of Puerto Rico to the United States. Declaration 
of organized territory for Puerto Rico, as a prelude thereafter to become 
a State of the Federal Union."33 Party leaders favored accelerating the 
Americanization project (the process of educating the Puerto Ricans in 
English to become "Americans"), which hopefully would lead to state-
hood. Accordingly, in the party's original political manifesto, leaders 
supported English as the language of instruction "in order to put the 
country ['eZ pais' [sic], referring to Puerto Rico] in conditions more 
favorable soon to become a new State of the Federation. "34 
Luis Munoz-Rivera continued to lead the AutonomistlLiberal Party, 
which also was undergoing a transformation after the invasion and 
Carmen Ramos de Santiago, El Gobierno de Puerto Rico 55-60 (1986) (discussing how the 
military governed the island in the early years following the war); see also Raymond Carr, 
Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment 32-33 (1984) (discussing military rule immediately 
following the war). For an interesting description of the period, see Leibowitz, supra note 
6, at 140-41. 
31 Creoles are persons of Spanish descent born in the colonies. See generally Fernando 
PieD, 1898: La Guerra despues de la Guerra 201-207 (1987) (concluding that the partidas 
were not a response to the United States invasion, but rather a rejection of the economic 
and social order that prevailed during Spanish times). See also Angel Rivero Mendez, 
Cr6nica de la Guerra Hispanoamericana en Puerto Rico 465-72 (1973) (describing the 
partidas as the acts of thiefs, and how they were put down by the U.S. military and the 
new Insular Police). 
32 PieD, supra, note 31, at 195-196 (concluding that the U.S. military had "rehabilitat-
ed the wealthy [mostly non-creole] landowners as arbiters of the rural [economic and 
social] order," after noting that both poor and wealthy criollos continued to challenge 
military rule). 
33 Manifiesto de los Dirigentes de la Agrupaci6n de los Puros Ortodoxos Dirigido al 
Pais Invitando a la Formaci6n del Partido Republicano Puertorriquelio, April 19, 1899, in 
1-1 Puerto Rico: Cien Alios de Lucha Politica 259-62 (Reece B. Bothwell-Gonzalez ed., 
1979) (translation by the author) [hereinafter Lucha Politica]' 
34Id. at 261. 
Race Law Stories (Rachel F. Moran and Devon W. Carbado, eds., Foundation Press 2008).
PEDRO A. MALAVET 119 
became the Partido Federal Puertorriqueno (Puerto Rican Federal Par-
ty) in October 1899. Perhaps surprisingly, the party's first official 
platform supported the immediate grant of territorial status to Puerto 
Rico and eventual statehood.35 But it also favored the absolute autonomy 
of the island's municipal governments to handle what the party called 
asuntos locales (local matters), especially education.36 This put leaders in 
direct conflict with the U.S. administrators and with the Puerto Rican 
Republican Party. On October 26, 1900, an editorial in La Democracia, 
the newspaper published by the Federal Party and edited by Munoz-
Rivera, criticized U.S. administrators as well as the Republican Party 
and its political thugs.37 The editorial ended with a call for withdrawal 
from the first election. Consequently, in 1900 the Federal Party boycot-
ted the election. 
In the November 1900 election, of 123,140 registered voters in 
Puerto Rico, 58,367 voted for Republicans, and 148 voted for Federals. 
Republican candidates were elected to all thirty-five positions in the 
newly created House of Delegates, and the sole Puerto Rican delegate to 
the U.S. Congress, called the resident commissioner, also was a Republi-
can. The Federal Party did not wholly withdraw from the 1902 elections, 
and its candidates were elected from two Puerto Rican districts. But the 
Puerto Rican Republican Party's candidate was again elected resident 
commissioner, and the majority of the delegates to the local legislative 
body were Republicans.38 
The turn of the twentieth century was characterized by turbas 
republicanas (Republican mobs or riots). The former Autonomists and 
supporters of the Federal Party were attacked by violent gangs associat-
ed with the Republican cause. These planned, non-spontaneous acts of 
violence were generally tolerated, and sometimes supported, by the U.S. 
authorities. In some of the more serious attacks, for example, one that 
35 Programa del Partido Federal, 1 de Octobre de 1899, in 1-1 Lucha Politica, supra 
note 33, at 271-72. In February 1904, the Federal Party dissolved itself and was reconsti-
tuted as the Partido Uni6n de Puerto Rico (Union Party of Puerto Rico). The party again 
included among its principal leaders Luis Munoz-Rivera, the Autonomist Party founder, 
but it also now included Rosendo Matienzo-Cintr6n, a prominent independence leader, as 
well as another important independence supporter, Jose de Diego. Again displaying the 
colonial political pragmatism that recognized strength in numbers, the party also included 
statehood supporters. Its name was specifically chosen to describe the intent to unify the 
party members' diverse political views regarding status. The official minutes of the 
convention can be found in 1-1 Lucha Politica, supra note 33, at 282-85. 
36 See Programa del Partido Federal, supra note 35, parr. 6, p. 271, and parr. 11, p. 
272. 
37 El Retraimiento, La Democracia, Oct. 26, 1900, reprinted in 1-1 Lucha Politica, 
supra note 33, at 273-74. 
38 Bayron Toro, supra note 26, at 115-16, 120-21. 
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took place on September 13, 1900, the turbas ransacked the offices of the 
Federal Party's newspaper, El Diario de Puerto Rico, destroying the 
printing equipment. The next day, the turbas shot at Munoz-Rivera's 
home, but the authorities actually charged him and other Federal Party 
members with crimes. Although Munoz-Rivera and the other defendants 
were acquitted of all charges on December 22, 1900, the atmosphere of 
fear and intimidation led many liberal politicians to flee Puerto Rico. 
Munoz-Rivera left for New York early in 1901 with his wife and infant 
son, Luis Munoz-Marin, and did not return to Puerto Rico until January 
26,1904.39 
The United States in 1901: In the Afterglow of the Spanish 
American War 
For the United States, the Spanish American War and the Downes 
ruling brought to an end the age of Northwest Ordinances and Jacksoni-
an manifest destiny,40 which had culminated in statehood, as the prevail-
ing theory of territorial expansion of the United States, in favor of a new 
colonial paradigm. In the aftermath of the war and the U.s. takeover of 
Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and Cuba, the United States Su-
preme Court gave constitutional approval to the acquisition and control 
of island territories for the sake of legal, political, and military control, 
rather than for national territorial expansion, accompanied by "immigra-
tion and settlement" by persons of acceptable American stock who were 
already citizens of the United States.41 Theodore Roosevelt called this 
"Americanism"; Henry Cabot Lodge labeled it the "large policy"; but it 
was imperialism, which the principal architect of America's naval doc-
trine at the time, Alfred T. Mahan, labeled as such and defined as "the 
extension of national authority over alien communities .... This broader 
39 See, e.g., Bolivar Pagan, 1 Historia de los Partidos Politicos Puertorriqueiios, 1898-
1956 at 74-75 (1972). Eventually, Luis Munoz-MarIn would become the first Puerto Rican-
elected governor of the island. 
40 By this I mean the phrase as it was first used by Democrats aligned with President 
Andrew Jackson, who favored the incorporation of the Oregon territories, Texas and the 
spoils of the Mexican-Anlerican War into the United States, eventually as states of the 
union. More generally, it was used to justify expansion of the United States, again through 
statehood, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. I am not using it in the sense that mostly-
Republican "expansionists" of the late 1890s and early twentieth century used it, since I 
prefer the clarity and distinguishability of the imperialism discourse, especially as it 
occurred around the elections of 1896, 1900, and 1904. See generally Julius W. Pratt, 
Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawai'i and the Spanish Islands 1-33 (1936) 
(contrasting territorial expansion of the early nineteenth-century United States, mostly 
associated with Democrats, with the late nineteenth-century overseas expansionism advo-
cated mostly by the Republicans). See also Zimmermann, supra note 4, at 13 (noting that 
most politicians who favored the concept avoided the term "imperialism" and barely 
tolerated "expansionism"). 
41 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
Race Law Stories (Rachel F. Moran and Devon W. Carbado, eds., Foundation Press 2008).
PEDRO A. MALA VET 121 
definition implies that a country does not have to own the territory of an 
alien community in order to exercise imperial authority over it.,,42 
Behind the political debate over territorial expansion was a profes-
sional debate over military doctrine. Prevailing doctrine deemed naval 
power the most important way to project military and political authority 
abroad. A show of force was seen as essential to being a strong player in 
international political and economic affairs, and to ensuring the security 
of the United States. No one influenced this thinking more than Alfred 
T. Mahan, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis and a 
commissioned naval officer. He became president of the Naval War 
College, reportedly much to the chagrin of Annapolis and Navy authori-
ties, in 1886. It was there that he became a naval history scholar and 
developed a new vision of American naval doctrine.43 This doctrine was 
driven by the need to project American power abroad. It required a large 
navy, with large capital ships, a canal in Panama, and the ability to 
maintain naval coaling stations throughout the world, especially in the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Mahan was a good scholar and a prolific 
writer, and his books and magazine articles became highly influential in 
political circles in Washington.44 Two of his particularly important fans 
were Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and future President 
Theodore Roosevelt.45 
Racism, supported by the pseudo-science of Social Darwinism, also 
justified the takeover of lands belonging to "inferior races. ,,46 Rubin 
Francis Weston explained: 
Those who advocated overseas expansion faced this dilemma: What 
kind of relationship would the new peoples have to the body politic? 
Was it to be the relationship of the Reconstruction period, an 
42 Zimmermann, supra note 4, at 13. 
43 See id. at 85-122 (referring to Mahan as a "pen-and-ink sailor"). 
44 See, e.g., Alfred T. Mahan, Some Neglected Aspects of War (1907), reprinted in 
Unilateral Force in International Relations pp. 20 et seq. (1972). Mahan's best-known work 
was The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, published in 1890. This book, 
along with another important volume of his, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present 
and Future, is available in electronic form at http://www.riapress.com/riapress/author. 
lasso?goto=23 & -session=StoreSession:A443E9A0143122F717NPkODE8FAB (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2006). 
45 Mahan and Roosevelt met at a critical time. In 1887, Mahan invited Roosevelt to 
lecture at the War College on the subject of the War of 1812, which Roosevelt had studied 
while a student at Harvard. Zimmermann, supra note 4, at 92. 
46 See generally Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of Ameri-
can Racial Anglo-Saxonism 208-13 (1981) in Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a 
Diverse America 254-58 (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter "Race and Races"] 
(excerpt describing the role of anti-Mexican Anglo white racism in the Mexican-American 
War). 
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attempt at political equality for dissimilar races, or was it to be the 
Southern "counterrevolutionary" point of view which denied the 
basic American constitutional rights to people of color? The actions 
of the federal government during the imperial period and the 
relation of the Negro to a status of second-class citizenship indicated 
that the Southern point of view would prevail. The racism which 
caused the relegation of the Negro to a status of inferiority was to be 
applied to the overseas possessions ofthe United StatesY 
Indeed, an important effect of the Spanish American War was to 
unite white southerners and northerners against a common enemy. In 
particular, the War served as a military reconciliation between white 
officers of the former Confederate armed forces and the professional 
military establishment. On Memorial Day in 1905, Senator Foraker, for 
whom Puerto Rico's Organic Act of 1900 was named, delivered an 
address in which he said: 
The Spanish-American War was attended with many good results, 
but one of the best was the impetus it gave to the restoration of 
cordial relations and the spirit of union and Americanism through-
out the country. It gave the young men of the South an opportunity 
to put on the blue and show their loyalty and devotion to the flag, 
and to win, as they did, a heroic share of the glory and greatness 
that were added to the Republic; while their representatives in 
public life distinguished themselves by the conspicuous and patriotic 
character of their utterances and services. What has followed is but 
the natural result, and every survivor of the Union Army should be 
profoundly thankful that his life has been spared to see such a 
complete vindication of all that for which he contended.48 
The War targeted the last Spanish island colonies in the Caribbean 
and Pacific. In President William McKinley's instructions to the U.S. 
delegation that negotiated the Treaty of Paris, he ordered that only one 
full territory be demanded from the Spanish: Puerto Rico.49 Although the 
47 Rubin Francis Weston, Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial As-
sumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946, at 15 (1972). Cornel West described the 
normative paradigm of "American" liberalism that produced these injustices. See Cornel 
West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive 
Critique 709 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
48 Address of Senator Foraker at Arlington National Cemetery, Memorial Day, May 30, 
1905, available at http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/foraker-1905.htm. 
49 Instructions of the President to the United States Peace Commissioners, September 
16, 1898, in U.S. Dep't of State, Papers Related to the Treaty with Spain, S. Doc. No. 56-
148 at 3-4 (1901). These papers were initially secret, but on February 5, 1901, the Senate 
lifted the "injunction of secrecy" and ordered the publication of 3000 volumes. Id. at 1. I 
specify "full" territory because the U.S. did demand the cession of individual islands in the 
Ladrones and Philippine archipelagos, Guam and Luzon, respectively. Id. at 4, 7. 
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islands were important to the United States for military and economic 
reasons, their principal attraction was their strategic location when the 
Spanish American War broke out. Indeed, the acquisition of Puerto Rico 
was contemplated from the very conception of the new "American 
empire" by two of its principal architects: 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, in a personal 
letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, wrote: " ... do not make peace 
until we get Porto Rico." Lodge replied: "Porto Rico is not forgotten 
and we mean to have it. Unless I am utterly ... mistaken, the 
administration is now fully committed to the large policy that we 
both desire."50 
After a failed ultimatum to Spain to pacify Cuba or leave,51 the 
conflict began on April 25, 1898. Congress then declared war, retroactive 
to April 21, 1898, the date on which the U.S. warship Nashville had 
captured the Spanish ship Buenaventura.52 Although the campaign can-
not be described as long or especially bloody, young men on both sides 
died and those who lived did so in fear. In the Puerto Rico campaign, 
seventeen Spanish soldiers were killed, eighty-eight wounded, and 324 
taken prisoner. Only three U.S. soldiers were killed, and forty were 
wounded, mostly by Puerto Rican irregular troops.53 The Spanish forces 
in Puerto Rico did not put up much of a fight; the guns of San Juan had 
not been fired in hostility since they repelled the British invasion in 
1797, and they had not been upgraded since then. The United States 
quickly captured the island. U.S. forces took Ponce, the largest city in 
the south, on July 28th, without firing a shot. At that time Major 
General Nelson Miles issued a proclamation announcing: 
To the inhabitants of Porto Rico: In the prosecution of the war 
against the Kingdom of Spain by the people of the United States, in 
the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its military forces have 
come to occupy the Island of Porto Rico [sic] . ... They bring you the 
fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in 
its justice and humanity to all those living within its folds. 
The chief object of the American military forces will be to 
overthrow the armed authority of Spain and to give to the people of 
50 The Puerto Ricans: A Documentary History 89 (Kal Wagenheim & Olga Jimenez-de 
Wagenheim eds., 1996) (emphasis added). 
51 President William McKinley signed the resolution on April 20. On April 21, the U.S. 
ambassador to Spain delivered an ultimatum to the Spanish government, giving it until 
noon on April 23, 1898, to pacify Cuba or leave. See Rivero Mendez, supra note 31, at 18-
24. 
52Id. 
53 ld. at 28; Hector Andres Negroni, Historia Militar de Puerto Rico 340 (1992). 
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your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty consistent with 
this military occupation .... [We have] come to bring protection, not 
only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your prosperity 
and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of liberal institu-
tions of our government. 54 
By August 12, 1898, the United States had ended its military 
operations in Puerto Rico, and on September 14, 1898, most of the 
remaining Spanish troops left the island. October 18th was the final day 
for the official surrender of San Juan to the U.s. troops, and the last few 
Spanish soldiers sailed aboard the warship Montevideo on October 23rd.55 
The Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, approved by the U.S. 
Senate, and ratified by the President in 1899, officially ended the 
Spanish American War, with the island of Puerto Rico as the United 
States' prize.56 
The national election of November 1900 was won by "Imperialist" 
McKinley over "anti-Imperialist" William Jennings Bryan. Between the 
time of McKinley's reelection and his assassination at the end of 1901, 
he finished the takeover of the island territories, including, though 
somewhat reluctantly, the Philippines.57 In the fall of 1900, the President 
and his administration had a strong interest in the Supreme Court cases 
that would define the President's authority over the newly conquered 
territories. 
Mr. Bidwell and the 576 Boxes of Oranges from Mayaguez 
Downes v. Bidwell is the principal storyline of the nine Insular 
Cases of the 1900 term.58 The term "Insular Cases" was widely used in 
54 Carr, supra note 30, at 31. 
55 The Puerto Ricans, supra note 50, at 102-03. 
56 The official title is the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and 
the Kingdom of Spain. See P.R. Laws Ann., vol. 1, 16; see also Race and Races, supra note 
46, at 327. Article II of the treaty reads: "Spain cedes to the United States the island of 
Porto Rico [sicl and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and 
the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones." Id. at 327. The editors of the Puerto 
Rican legal collection changed the references to "Porto Rico" included in the original 
English to "Puerto Rico." See P.R. Laws Ann., vol. 1, p. 17. 
57 Zimmermann, supra note 4, at 316 (discussing McKinley as a reluctant imperialist, 
especially about the Philippines); see also id. at 393 (noting that "Bryan made 'imperial-
ism' the primary issue of his campaign"); see also id. at 401-02 ("[Oln September 6, 1901, 
President McKinley was shot . . . at the mammoth Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo ... 
and he died on September 14 [1901l."). 
58 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 244; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. 
United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Crossman v. United States (Hawaiian Case), 182 U.S. 
221; Dooley v. United States (Dooley 1), 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 
182 U.S. 243 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley 
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the media and the legal literature to describe this litigation.59 The 
Supreme Court itself designated these lawsuits as the "Insular Tariff 
Cases," as indicated in its statement of the case in De Lima v. Bidwell.60 
The use of the word "insular" rather than "territory" distinguished the 
new possessions from the territories existing prior to the Spanish Ameri-
can War, which were destined for eventual statehood. Accordingly, the 
United States Supreme Court used "Insular Cases" as a reference to the 
lawsuits resolved in 1901 involving the territorial possessions acquired 
after the Spanish American War, and beginning with Hawai'i v. Manki-
chi.61 As used in this context, "insular" simply means "relating to, or 
constituting an island. ,,62 
Most of the cases involved the collection of taxes and tariffs on 
Puerto Rican agricultural products brought to the United States, but the 
disputes necessarily raised questions regarding the meaning of citizen-
ship and how the U.S. Constitution would be applied to the new island 
territories. Taxes, crops, and citizenship were important themes in 
Puerto Rico in 1901. The island was still reeling, not so much from the 
Spanish American War as from the storm islanders called "San Ciriaco" 
(Saint Cyril), which hit Puerto Rico in August 1899, causing death as 
well as property and crop destruction.63 A popular seis, the music of 
Puerto Rican farm laborers, blamed American racism and taxes for the 
Puerto Ricans' post-war and post-storm suffering. After bemoaning the 
loss of the coffee crop, the song attributed the troubles to U.S. imperial-
ism rather than a natural disaster: 
I am, man, convinced/that the bad situation / does not depend on the 
cyclone / as many have believed. / The blame of the yanqui has been 
/ that he hates us very, very much / and if what I hear is true, / 
v. United States (Dooley II), 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States 
(The Diamond Rings), 183 U.S. 176 (1901). 
59 See, e.g., Charles E. Littlefield, The Insular Cases, Address Before the American Bar 
Association (Aug. 22, 1901), in 15 Harv. L. Rev. 169 (1901). 
60 182 U.S. 1, 2 (1901). 
61 190 U.S. 197 (1903). The Supreme Court has used the phrase "insular cases" in 
twenty-three of its published opinions, starting with Mankichi, and has referred more 
generally to the cases or the possessions twenty-eight times. Lexis Search conducted June 
26, 2006. The most recent reference is United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) 
(regarding tribal authority to prosecute crimes). The Court also makes passing reference to 
"insular possessions" in regard to the habeas corpus statute in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466, 475 (2004) (case arising out of detentions in Guantanamo). 
62 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 628 (rev. ed. 1990). 
63 Pedro Malavet-Vega, De las Bandas al Trio Borinquen: 1900-1927, at 36-37 (2002). 
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when they collect the tax/how dangerous this is! / we are really bad off, 
Perucho!64 
The song went on to indict the "absorbent [yanqui] race" for "not being 
able to take" the Puerto Ricans. 
The Insular Cases were so important in their day that the filing of 
the cases was widely reported,65 and oral arguments occurred over a 
period of ten days, with the resulting opinions occupying hundreds of 
pages over two volumes of the U.S. Reports. Soon after the cases were 
decided, the 56th Congress ordered a reprinting of the parties' written 
briefs and transcription of the oral arguments into a volume, which the 
Supreme Court Reports note-with some sense of awe-"amounted to 
1075 pages.,,66 Though May 27, 1901 was to be the last day of the term, 
the reading of the opinions in the Insular Cases took about five hours, 
forcing the court to reconvene the next day.67 Due to the importance of 
the cases, "[t]he small courtroom was crowded to repletion throughout 
the day, prominent government officials and many attorneys being 
present, and the proceedings were followed from start to finish with 
keen interest."68 Both the Washington Post and the New York Times ran 
front-page articles reporting on the decisions, noting that the room was 
full of government dignitaries, including Secretary of War Elihu Root.69 
Elihu Root was a successful New York corporate lawyer with no 
military experience when he was selected for the position of Secretary of 
War by President McKinley. In choosing Root, President McKinley was 
"not looking for anyone who kn[ew] anything about war or for anyone 
who kn[ew] anything about the army; he [needed] a lawyer to direct the 
government of these Spanish islands. ,,70 The Insular Possessions were 
64 See id. at 37, 115 n.13 (noting that the song was published in the "labor newspaper 
El Pan del Pobre (the Poor Man's Bread), on 25 August 1901"). The song's original 
Spanish lyrics are: "Estoy, chico, convencido/ que la mala situaci6n/ no depende del cicl6n/ 
como muchos han creido./ La culpa del yanqui ha sido/ que nos odia mucho, mucho/ y si es 
cierlo 10 que escucho,l cuando cobren el impuesto,l ique peligroso esta esto!/ ique mal 
estamos Perucho!" Id. (translation by the author). 
65 See, e.g., Held Over By Supreme Court; Cases Involving Question Whether Porto Rico 
and Philippines Are Part of United States Postponed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1900, at 8. 
66 De Lima, 182 U.S. at 3; H.R. Con. Res. 72, 56th Congo (1901); The Insular Cases: 
Comprising the Records, Briefs, and Arguments of Counsel in the Insular Cases of the 
October Term, 1900, in the Supreme Court of the United States, Including the Appendixes 
Thereto (1901) [hereinafter Insular Cases]. 
67 Court Decides Insular Cases, N.Y. Times, May 28,1901, at 1. 
68Id. 
69 The Status of Our Insular Possessions, Wash. Post, May 28, 1901, at 1; Court 
Decides Insular Cases, supra note 67. 
70 Leech, supra note 13, at 379; see also Zimmermann, supra note 4, at 147--48 
(recounting the same story). 
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regulated through the War Department from 1898 until 1934, when that 
responsibility was shifted to the Department of the Interior.71 As Secre-
tary of War, Root therefore was an important figure in the Insular Cases 
and an interested and quite knowledgeable listener as the opinions were 
read.72 
In the first opinion to be read, De Lima, the Court ruled that for the 
purpose of imposing import tariffs in the United States, Puerto Rico was 
not a foreign country but rather a U.S. territory.73 Specifically, Justice 
Henry Billings Brown-speaking for himself, Chief Justice Melville Wes-
ton Fuller, and Justices John Marshall Harlan, David Josiah Brewer, 
and Rufus Wheeler Peckham-stated that "by the ratification of the 
treaty of Paris the island became territory of the United States, although 
not an organized territory in the technical sense of the word."74 Therefore, 
sugar from Puerto Rico was not "imported merchandise" under the 
general tariff laws of the United States75 because the tariffs in those laws 
applied only to imports from foreign countries and George R. Bidwell, 
the collector of taxes at the port of New York, lacked the authority to 
levy tariffs on Puerto Rican products under the law. Accordingly, "the 
duties [on sugar imported from Puerto Rico] were illegally exacted, and 
... the plaintiffs [were] entitled to recover them back."76 
But, anticipating his future concurrence in Downes, Justice Joseph 
McKenna-speaking for himself and Justices Edward Douglass White 
and George Shiras, Jr.-indicated in dissent that the status of Puerto 
71 See Jose Trias Monge, Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World 58 
(1997). This text incorrectly gives 1933 as the date, which is probably a typographical error, 
because the author's more detailed collection, and his original source, indicates 1934; see 
also Trias Monge, 2 Historia Constitucional de Puerto Rico 206-214 (1981) (discussing the 
transfer of authority to the Department of the Interior). 
72 See Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root 348 (1938) (providing an interesting analysis of the 
correspondence and discussion between Root, then Secretary of State John Hay, and 
President McKinley on the subject of the territories, concluding that "Root did not trust 
Congress to do an efficient job in mapping out a form of colonial government [for the 
insular possessions]"). Shortly before his assassination, McKinley expressed his intention 
to create a bureau in the Department of State to deal with the insular possessions. On 
September, 14, 1901, Root wrote Hay to express his support for the "Bureau of Insular 
Affairs" at the Department of State, because supervision of the insular governments "can 
go where it belongs under civil control in the nearest approach we can make to a 
Department of Colonial Affairs." Id. at 349-50. 
73 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 174 (narrowly construing the question presented in 
the case as "whether territory acquired by the United States by cession from a foreign 
power remains a 'foreign country' within the meaning of the tarifflaws"). 
74 Id. at 196 (emphasis added). 
75 Id. at 175. 
76 Id. at 200. 
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Rico represented "a relation to the United States between that of being a 
foreign country absolutely and of being domestic territory absolutely."77 
Where the majority had seen only two categories, foreign countries and 
domestic territories, the dissenters saw three: "foreign countries," such 
as Spain, "domestic territory[, such] as New York," and "[b]etween 
these extremes ... other relations, ... Porto Rico occup[ying] one of 
them."78 The majority had noted the distinction between U.S. territories 
that are "organized" and those that are "not organized," but, as their 
votes in Downes would make clear, four of the five members of that 
majority (Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham) did not intend that 
distinction to have constitutional significance either in setting the limits 
of federal authority over the insular possessions or in extending civil 
rights to their residents. 
In fact, De Lima was immediately eclipsed by the reading of the 
Downes decision. Downes is the most important of the Insular Cases, 
because it interprets the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900,79 which turned 
Puerto Rico into an "organized" territory-one that is subject to a 
congressional organic statute. The Act-named after the Republican 
Senator from Ohio, Joseph Benson Foraker-authorized a U.S.-appoint-
ed civilian government to be established on the island, and provided for 
its chief executive, the governor, to be named by the President of the 
United States.80 Additionally, the President appointed the members of 
the cabinet, known as the Executive Council, who also acted as the upper 
legislative house. The lower house of thirty-five delegates was elected by 
the people of Puerto Rico. The Act further provided that the Chief 
Justice and associate Justices of the island's supreme court would be 
appointed by the President of the United States. In addition, the Act 
created the Federal District Court for Puerto Rico.81 This regime lasted 
until 1917, when it was replaced by the Jones Act.82 
77 ld. at 220 (McKenna, J., dissenting). 
78 ld. at 200-01. 
79 The facts in De Lima occurred in fall 1899, before passage of the Foraker Act. 
80 See Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 48 U.S.C.). The Act is also transcribed in vol. 1 of the Laws of Puerto Rico 
Annotated, under the heading "Historical Documents." See P.R. Laws Ann., vol. 1, pp. 24-
48. See also Foraker Act § 17, in P.R. Laws Ann., vol. 1, 36-37. 
81 See generally Foraker Act §§ 18-27, 33-34. Section 27 provides that the Executive 
Council shall be one of the two houses of the legislative assembly. This appointed body 
arguably has been the most important element in the process of "Americanizing" Puerto 
Rico. See Pedro A. Caban, Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United 
States, 1898-1932, at 122-26 (1999). 
82 See Jones Act of 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 953. 
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During discussion of the Foraker Bill, the U.S. Senate changed the 
references to "Puerto Rico" contained in the original draft to "Porto 
Rico," which was used in the final proposal and was only changed by law 
in 1932.83 Beyond the misspelling of Puerto Rico's name, the Senate 
made a more significant change: It removed from the draft of the bill any 
reference to extending the United States Constitution to the territory of 
Puerto Rico. This set up the legal question that would be resolved in 
Downes: Does the Constitution automatically apply in a U.S. territory? 
The Senators' decision was explained thusly: 
The change was made because of the opinion expressed by the 
members of the committee that our Constitution is not suited to the 
Puerto Rican people. The opinion was also quite general that the 
extension of the Constitution was not necessary. Some of the Sena-
tors [sic] expressed the opinion that the natives of the island were 
not yet prepared for jury trials.84 
What started out as a bill to extend civil rights and government to 
Puerto Rico, and to include the island in the free trade internal to the 
United States, became a much simpler organic act to enable civilian 
government for the island. Republican protectionists scuttled the free 
trade provisions and substituted a tax.85 Therefore, the Foraker Act 
imposed a tax of "fifteen per centum of the duties which are required to 
be levied, collected, and paid upon like articles of merchandise imported 
from foreign countries" on Puerto Rican imports into the United 
States.86 On November 20, 1900, Bidwell, the same collector of customs 
at the port of New York involved in De Lima, demanded $659.35 in 
taxes, a not insubstantial sum for that day: 
upon thirty-three (33) boxes of oranges ... from the port of San 
Juan .. , and ... upon 543 boxes of oranges, [also] the product of 
the island of Porto Rico, consigned to these plaintiffs ["Samuel B. 
Downes, doing business under the firm name of S.B. Downes & 
83 See Government of Puerto Rico; Senate Committee on the Island Discusses the 
Foraker Bill and Makes Changes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1900, at 4. See also Act of May 17, 
1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731a (1999)) ("That from and after the 
passage of this resolution [May 17, 1932] the island designated 'Porto Rico' in the Act 
entitled 'An Act to provide a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes,' 
approved March 2, 1917, as amended, shall be known and designated as 'Puerto Rico.' All 
laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such 
island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to 
such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.' "). 
84 Government of Puerto Rico, supra note 83, at 4. 
85 Leech, supra note 13, at 487-89 (detailing the development of the bill in Congress). 
86 Foraker Act § 3. This was a change from the originally proposed bill, reportedly as a 
result of protests from and lobbying by sugar producers and citrus farmers. See Leech, 
supra note 13, at 488. 
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Company,"] at the port of New York and brought thither from the 
port of Mayaguez in the said island of Porto Rico during the month 
of November, 1900, by the steamer Ponce.87 
The plaintiffs paid under protest, got their oranges and, represented by 
the N ew York City law firm Coudert Brothers,88 filed their suit that same 
day! The complaint, which was personally verified under oath by Samuel 
B. Downes, alleged a case "arising under" the Constitution, specifically: 
the said oranges were not liable to duty, the same not having been 
imported from any foreign country within the meaning of any valid 
statute or executive order of the United States, but were merchan-
dise which must, under and by virtue of the provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States in that regard, be admitted to free 
entry in any port of the United States.89 
Procedurally, this case arose during the period of the Evarts Act of 
1891, during which the circuit courts lost their appellate jurisdiction to 
the newly-created courts of appeals, but retained their original trial 
jurisdiction.90 Additionally, this was not long after the lower federal 
courts were first granted original jurisdiction over federal question 
complaints by the Judiciary Act of 1875,91 and the case predates the 1938 
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, rather 
than filing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the current Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, Henry L. Burnett, filed a demurrer arguing "[t]hat 
the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action."92 On November 30, 1900, Circuit Judge Henry Lacombe heard 
87 Transcript of Record, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (No. 507), reprinted in 
Insular Cases, supra note 66, at 724. 
88 Paul Fuller was a partner at Coudert Brothers, which represented the private 
litigants in the most important Insular Cases, along with Frederic R. Coudert, Jr. Fuller 
was born in 1856, orphaned of mother and abandoned by his father. He was raised by 
Charles Coudert and became a prominent attorney in the New York Bar. He helped to 
found Fordham Law School and was its dean. See Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, The 
Paul Fuller Memorial Children's Service Program: Coudert Brothers LLP Globalizes Pro 
Bono, at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view & artMonth=Au-
gust & artYear=2004 & EntryNo=1474 (last visited Aug. 27, 2006). 
89 Insular Cases, supra note 66, at 724. 
90 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 22-23 (1989) (citing Act of Mar. 3, 
1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826). According to Chemerinsky, "In 1911, the circuit courts were 
eliminated and their original trial jurisdiction transferred to the district courts." Id. at 23 
(citing Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087). 
91 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 90, 
at 222. 
92 Insular Cases, supra note 66, at 725. 
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oral arguments and ruled in favor of the defendant, ordering the com-
plaint dismissed and awarding costs to the defendant.93 The next day, 
judgment was entered dismissing the action and taxing costs in the 
amount of sixteen dollars and thirty cents. 94 Downes filed a writ of error 
and notice of appeal with the circuit court on December 5, 1900. Judge 
Lacombe officially allowed the matter to proceed, and John A. Shields, 
clerk of the court, certified a nineteen-page record for appeal on Decem-
ber 7, 1900, with costs paid by canceling a "ten-cent U.S. internal 
revenue stamp.,,95 The case was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on 
December 11, 1900 and assigned case number 507.96 
Justice Brown announced the Court's decision to uphold the lower 
court ruling, but he wrote only for himself. The other Justices filed 
separate opinions to explain their reasons for upholding the tax. Justice 
Brown concluded: 
that the Island of Porto Rico is a territory appurtenant and belong-
ing to the United States, but not a part of the United States within 
the revenue clauses of the Constitution; [and] that the Foraker act 
is constitutional, so far as it imposes [discriminatory] duties upon 
imports from such island [to the United States].97 
Justice White's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Shiras and 
McKenna, the same three who had subscribed to McKenna's dissent in 
De Lima, had the most votes. Articulating what would eventually be-
come the accepted doctrine, Justice White found that Puerto Rico, and 
by analogy Guam and the Philippines, was an organized, but unincorpo-
rated, territory of the United States-that is, part of the United States 
under the Territorial Clause,98 but subject to absolute congressional 
legislative authority under that provision and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.99 
93 Order, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (No. 507), reprinted in Insular Cases, 
supra note 66, at 725. 
94 Judgment, Downes, 182 U.S. 244 (No. 507), reprinted in Insular Cases, supra note 
66, at 726. 
95 Writ of Error, Downes, 182 U.S. 244 (No. 507), reprinted in Insular Cases, supra 
note 66, at 721; Clerk's Memo with Judge's Authorization, Downes, 182 U.S. 244 (No. 507), 
reprinted in Insular Cases, supra note 66, at 721-722; Certification of the Record, Downes, 
182 U.S. 244 (No. 507), reprinted in Insular Cases, supra note 66, at 722. The system of 
canceling stamps to pay court filing fees is still used in the local courts in Puerto Rico. 
96 Insular Cases, supra note 66, at 729. 
97 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 287. The Foraker Act required "the payment of '15 
per centum of the duties which are required to be levied, collected, and paid upon like 
articles of merchandise imported from foreign countries.' " Id. at 247-48. 
98 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
99 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Justice Gray, the final vote for the bare majority, issued a separate 
concurrence.100 In it, he sought to limit the impact of the majority's 
position by characterizing Puerto Rico's status as temporary: "If Con-
gress is not ready to construct a complete government for the conquered 
territory, it may establish a temporary government, which is not subject 
to all the restrictions ofthe Constitution."lOl Justice White's opinion also 
included an important caveat suggesting that territorial status could not 
last forever: 
Conceding, then, for the purpose of the argument, it to be true that 
it would be a violation of duty under the Constitution for the 
legislative department, in the exercise of its discretion, to accept a 
cession of and permanently hold territory which is not intended to 
be incorporated, the presumption necessarily must be that that 
department, which within its lawful sphere is but the expression of 
the political conscience of the people of the United States, will be 
faithful to its duty under the Constitution, and therefore, when the 
unfitness of particular territory for incorporation is demonstrated, 
the occupation will terminate. I cannot conceive how it can be held 
that pledges made to an alien people can be treated as more sacred 
than is that great pledge given by every member of every depart-
ment of the government of the United States to support and defend 
the Constitution.102 
Despite these reassurances, neither opinion sought to set a time limit on 
the Foraker Act's provisions, and to this day, Puerto Rico remains an 
unincorporated territory of the United States, albeit with an increasingly 
powerful locally elected government. 
Despite its division, the majority rejected the argument that, in 
matters of taxation, Congress could not treat the U.S. territory of Puerto 
Rico differently than a state; thus, Puerto Rican exports to the U.S. 
mainland were subject to duties not imposed on products of the states, 
and import tariffs on oranges, sugar, or any other Puerto Rican product 
were legitimately imposed by Congress.103 Most importantly, the Downes 
majority gave Congress almost unfettered discretion to do with Puerto 
Rico what it wanted. 
100 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 344-47 (Gray, J., concurring). 
101 Id. at 346. This position was eventually adopted by a majority of the Court in 
Balzac, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (expressly adopting White's opinion as controlling). 
102 Id. at 343-44 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
103 In other words, the equal taxation provision of the Constitution did not benefit 
Puerto Rico. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall 
be uniform throughout the United States."). 
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The four dissenting Justices-Chief Justice Fuller and Justices 
Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham-joined a single dissenting opinion au-
thored by Chief Justice Fuller.104 The dissent called for constitutional 
values to prevail over the desire for empire that turned Puerto Rico into 
a separate and subordinate possession: 
[The Founders] may not, indeed, have deliberately considered a 
triumphal progress of the nation, as such, around the earth, but as 
[Chief Justice John] Marshall wrote: "It is not enough to say that 
this particular case was not in the mind of the convention when the 
article was framed, nor of the American people when it was adopted. 
It is necessary to go further, and to say that, had this particular case 
been suggested, the language would have been so varied as to 
exclude it, or it would have been made a special exception." 
This cannot be said, and on the contrary, in order to the 
successful extension of our institutions, the reasonable presumption 
is that the limitations on the exertion of arbitrary power would have 
been made more rigorous.105 
Justice Harlan issued a separate dissent, which has come to be held in 
high regard.106 In his opinion, he found the sui generis distinction 
between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" territories less than com-
pelling: 
I am constrained to say that this idea of "incorporation" has some 
occult meaning which my mind does not apprehend. It is enveloped 
in some mystery which I am unable to unravel. In my opinion, Porto 
Rico became, at least after the ratification of the treaty with Spain, a 
part of and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in respect 
of all its territory and people, and Congress could not thereafter 
impose any duty, impost, or excise with respect to that island and its 
inhabitants, which departed from the rule of uniformity established 
by the Constitution.107 
In short, the dissenters did not believe that the insular possessions 
should be relegated to an uncertain status between independence and 
statehood based on special exceptions or the manipulation of vague legal 
terms. 
Downes established that, in matters of taxation, Congress could 
treat the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico differently than a state; thus, 
Puerto Rican exports to the U.S. mainland were subject to duties not 
104 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 347-75 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
105Id. at 374-75. 
106Id. at 375-91 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
107Id. at 391. 
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imposed on products in interstate commerce. I08 More importantly, the 
Downes majority gave Congress almost unfettered discretion to do with 
Puerto Rico what it wanted. For those who believed that territorial 
expansion based on an imperialist and colonial model was sound national 
policy, the obvious contradictions between Justice Brown's positions in 
De Lima and Downes were intellectually indefensible. As a result, Justice 
White's concurring opinion became the preferred theory for the pro-
empire view. This was not lost on the New York Times, which editorial-
ized soon after the cases that: 
The De Lima case was a stumbling block for Justice Brown. By 
asserting in that case the principle that cession and possession made 
Porto Rico a part of the territory of the United States he invalidated 
much of the reasoning by which he reached, in the Downes case, the 
conclusion that for purposes of tariff legislation the island is not 
territory of the United States within the prohibition which the 
Constitution lays upon Congress respecting uniform taxes. In mak-
ing this assertion we are supported by the high authority of Horace 
Gray and by the clearly reasoned opinion of Justice White, speaking 
for himself and Justices Shiras and McKenna, concurring in the 
view that the Porto Rican tariff is not repugnant to the Constitu-
tion, but reaching that conclusion by a process of reasoning and 
interpretation solidly based upon the historical practice and judicial 
sanctions of a century of territorial increase. It would have been 
better for the reputation of the Supreme Court had the task of 
writing its opinion in the controlling case of Downes been committed 
to Justice White.109 
Some of the most prominent legal thinkers of the time took posi-
tions on the matter, most notably in early issues of the Harvard Law 
Review and the Yale Law Journal. Indeed, the early volumes of those 
two journals are full of articles debating the legal status of the new 
island territories. For example, Harvard Law School Dean Christopher 
Langdell supported unfettered congressional authority,110 as did Simeon 
E. Baldwin.11l Recognizing that U.S. administrators were in effective 
108 See supra note 103. 
109 Editorial, The Court and the Opinions, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1901, at 8. The New 
York Times editorial also noted another strength in Justice White's opinion: it overruled 
Dred Scott u. Sandford. Id. 
110 C. C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 379-392 
(1899) (detailing how, in the author's view, most provisions limiting congressional authori-
ty to legislate did not apply to the new territories). 
111 See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The People of the United States, 8 Yale L.J. 159, 159 & 
167 (1899) (arguing that the phrase "the People of the United States" in the preamble of 
the Constitution limited the applicability of the Constitution to citizens of the states); see 
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control of the conquered territories, Baldwin addressed executive powers, 
and, referring specifically to the power of the presidency, he wrote: "all 
honest men, not blinded by party passion, felt that the President held 
great constitutional functions, which made him, in his sphere, little short 
of the dictator of the Republic.'>l12 More generally, this legal scholarship 
interpreted the Territorial Clause along three very different lines: (1) It 
conferred absolute congressional power, totally unfettered by other con-
stitutional constraints; (2) It granted almost completely unfettered con-
gressional authority, which was limited by fundamental constitutional 
guarantees; and (3) It implied the "Constitution Follows the Flag," 
meaning that all constitutional guarantees and constraints on congres-
sional power applied in the territories.ll3 
Downes effectively established different types of "domestic territo-
ries," but now in concurrence rather than in dissent as in De Lima. 
White's distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories 
was important, because at that time the United States already had other 
territories, most of which were then believed to be on their way to 
statehood, including Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Alaska, and Ha-
wai'i. The status of these territories made arguments about absolute 
congressional authority unacceptable to scholars such as Abbott Law-
rence Lowell.ll4 Lowell objected that "[t]he narrower view of the Consti-
tution, that which limits its provisions to the area of the States [might] 
allow[] Congress to confiscate property in the District of Columbia or in 
a Territory without compensation, or ... to pass a bill of attainder 
against a resident of Washington or of Arizona, and order him hung 
without trial.'>l15 
Although the Downes decision triggered some controversy among 
legal scholars, its admittedly fragmented holdings would come to be a 
shared constitutional vision that today enjoys almost unanimous support 
among the Justices, no matter their political stripes. There is currently 
little doubt that the Constitution does not follow the flag and that 
Congress has broad discretion to govern insular possessions that are 
also Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and 
Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1899) (upon 
approval of the Treaty of Paris by the U.S. Senate, authority to govern the territories 
would be transferred from the executive to the legislative branch). 
112 Simeon E. Baldwin, Absolute Power, an American Institution, 7 Yale L.J. 1, 19 
(1897). 
113 See Trfas Monge, 1 Historia Constitucional, supra note 24, at 238 (providing a 
succinct analysis ofthe legal literature of the time). 
114 Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13 
Harv. L. Rev. 155 (1899). 
115 Id. at 156-57. 
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permanently in limbo, moving neither toward statehood nor indepen-
dence. Downes came to achieve this authoritative status through a series 
of later decisions, all of which are treated as part of the Insular Cases. 
The Aftermath of Downes 
In evaluating the aftermath of Downes, some authors take a broad 
view, identifying the Insular Cases as a complex series of decisions that 
helped create the "American Empire.,,116 One might also situate the 
cases even more generally within the law of conquest or the "right of 
discovery."117 My aim is to examine these cases as constitutional mo-
ments in which the Supreme Court both legitimized and helped to 
effectuate a second age of American territorial expansion at the turn of 
the twentieth century. 
Most students of American law know Dred Scott v. Sandford118 for 
its shameful definition of Mrican slaves as non-citizens and chattel 
property rather than individuals entitled to constitutional rights. But 
Scott v. Sandford was also a Territorial Clause case in which the 
majority stated: 
The power to expand the territory of the United States by the 
admission of new States is plainly given; and in the construction of 
this power by all the departments of the Government, it has been 
held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission at 
the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation 
would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become a State, and 
not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute 
authority.119 
Scott v. Sandford represents the first age of American territorial expan-
sion, characterized by conquest of the native inhabitants followed by 
colonization by the growing U.S. immigrant population. 
The nine Insular Cases of the October 1900 term ushered us into a 
second age of expansion that did not involve territorial incorporation 
into the nation through statehood, but rather the holding of colonies 
subject to almost absolute congressional authority. After the nine cases 
decided in the October 1900 term, the Court addressed a series of 
"intermediate cases," resolved between 1903 and 1922, in which first the 
116 See, e.g., Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of Race: The Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. Miami L. Rev. 691, 708-711 (1999) (noting that 
Scott v. Sandford gave constitutional authority for constructs of citizens and noncitizens 
within U.S. territorial control). 
117 See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
118 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
119Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
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Fuller Court, then the White Court in 1910, and finally the Taft Court in 
1921, tried to agree on a single constitutional doctrine in their applica-
tion of the Territorial Clause. These cases demonstrated that the unin-
corporated status of a territory could lead to second-class citizenship for 
its residents. 
These intermediate cases start with Hawai'i v. Mankichi in 1903, in 
which the court ruled that Hawaiian territorial law, not the Seventh 
Amendment, governed the defendant's right to a criminal jury trial. 
Justices White and McKenna concurred, stating that Congress had not 
expressly incorporated Hawai'i; therefore, full constitutional protections 
such as the right to jury trial did not apply.120 Mankichi was soon 
followed by Gonzales v. Williams, a unanimous ruling written by Chief 
Justice Fuller in favor of a Puerto Rican woman seeking entry into New 
York City after the Immigration Commissioner had declared her a 
foreigner and excluded her from the city.l2l The court held that Puerto 
Ricans, while not U.S. citizens, are nonetheless subjects or "nationals" 
of this country, and therefore not foreigners for purposes of the immigra-
tion laws. Later in 1904, the Court issued Kepner v. United States,122 
Binns v. United States,123 and, more importantly, Dorr v. United States, 
in which a majority reaffirmed the incorporation doctrine first articulat-
ed by Justice White in Downes, and found that the Philippines constitut-
ed an unincorporated territory.124 
In 1905, a case involving territorial Alaska, Rassmussen v. United 
States, reiterated the result of the 1901 decisions and continued to 
solidify a prevailing view from among the many articulated by the 
Justices in the earlier opinions.125 Writing for the majority, Justice White 
ruled that Alaska, unlike Puerto Rico, was an incorporated territory of 
the United States, with full constitutional protections for its residents. 
Other cases that applied White's incorporation doctrine in this period 
were Dowdell v. United States126 in 1911, and Porto Rico v. Rosaly127 in 
1913. In Rosaly, then-Chief Justice White wrote for a unanimous court 
120 Hawai'i v. Mankichi, 190 U.s. 197,218-21 (1903) (White, J., concurring). 
121 Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904). 
122 195 U.S. 100 (1904). 
123 194 U.S. 486 (1904) (involving taxation in Alaska). 
124 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). 
125 Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905). 
126 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (holding that Dorr disposes of the matter and that the 
Philippine Supreme Court properly affirmed defendants' convictions after requiring trial 
court to supplement record on appeal). 
127227 U.S. 270 (1913). 
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that Puerto Rico was a "completely organized Territory [of,J although 
not ... incorporated into the United States."128 
The Foraker Act-the Organic Act for Puerto Rico interpreted in 
Downes-was replaced by the Jones Act of 1917, making changes to the 
local government and, most significantly, giving Puerto Ricans U.S. 
citizenship.129 In 1922, Balzac v. Porto Rico130 applied the Jones Act and, 
in the process, turned Justice White's concurrence in Downes into 
normative constitutional doctrine, and still quite applicable precedent. 
The court unanimously affirmed Downes, citing Justice White's opinion 
and the incorporation doctrine as controlling, which helped to clarify the 
constitutional relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States.13l 
On the specific facts of the case, Balzac ruled that even after the grant of 
U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto Rico, not all U.s. constitution-
al protections applied to the territory:132 fundamental rights, generally 
those guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, would automatically apply 
to U.S. citizens living in the unincorporated territories, but personal 
freedoms, such as the rights to trial by jury and uniform taxation, would 
not.133 This decision is often considered the last of the Insular Cases 
because subsequent opinions have simply reinforced the doctrinal ap-
proaches adopted in Downes and Balzac. 
The Supreme Court came close to overruling these two decisions in 
the 1957 case of Reid v. Covert,134 but could muster only a plurality. The 
128 [d. at 274 (quoting New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 476 (1909)) 
(ruling that the Puerto Rican government enjoyed sovereign immunity). See Rebecca S. 
Shoemaker, The White Court: Justices, Rulings, and Legacy 3 (2004); Walter F. Pratt, Jr., 
The Supreme Court Under Edward Douglass White, 1910-1921 at 88 (1999). 
129 See Jones Act of 1917, § 5, P.R. Laws Ann. vol. 1, pp. 72-73, (conferring U.S. 
citizenship on all "citizens of Porto Rico [sic]"; it adopted the definition of Puerto Rican 
citizenship included in § 7 of the Foraker Act). This new law, however, left some confusion 
about Puerto Rican citizenship that required judicial resolution. See Jones Act of 1917, 
§ 13, P.R. Laws Ann. vol. 1, p. 83; § 43, P.R. Laws Ann. vol. 1, p. 120. See also Ediberto 
Roman, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1998) (a detailed study of the legal issues related to the grant of U.S. 
citizenships to the Puerto Ricans); Puig Jimenez v. Glover, 255 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1958) 
(plaintiff born in Puerto Rico in 1922 who resided on the island for fourteen years, but 
whose return from a visit to Spain was delayed from 1936 to July 1941 because of the 
Spanish civil war, was a U.S. citizen pursuant to the Jones Act, because she established her 
residence in Puerto Rico prior to the trip to Spain and her absence was involuntary). 
130 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
131 [d. at 305 (stating that "the opinion of Mr. Justice White of the majority, in Downes 
v. Bidwell, has become the settled law of the court"). 
132 [d. 
133 [d. at 312-13. 
134 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
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case involved two civilian women, both U.S. citizens, tried by military 
tribunals for killing their husbands, members of the U.s. armed forces, 
on American military bases in England and Japan. The Court held that 
depriving the women of their right to a jury trial in a civilian court 
violated their constitutional rights, ruling that the Constitution protects 
citizens when they are outside of the United States. Specifically criticiz-
ing Balzac and Downes, Justice Hugo Black, joined by Chief Justice Earl 
Warren and Justices William Douglas and William Brennan, wrote: 
This Court and other federal courts have held or asserted that 
various constitutional limitations apply to the Government when it 
acts outside the continental United States. While it has been sug-
gested that only those constitutional rights which are "fundamen-
tal" protect Americans abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or 
otherwise, for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection 
of "Thou shalt nots" which were explicitly fastened on all depart-
ments and agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution 
and its Amendments. Moreover, in view of our heritage and the 
history of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, it 
seems peculiarly anomalous to say that trial before a civilian judge 
and by an independent jury picked from the common citizenry is not 
a fundamental right.135 
But concurring in the result only, Justices Felix Frankfurter and John 
Marshall Harlan H136 distinguished the Insular Cases, believing them to 
be good law. In his opinion, Justice Frankfurter put it this way: 
The results in the cases that arose by reason of the acquisition of 
exotic "Territory" do not control the present cases, for the territori-
al cases rest specifically on Art. N, § 3, which is a grant of power to 
Congress to deal with "Territory" and other Government property. 
Of course the power sought to be exercised in Great Britain and 
Japan does not relate to "Territory.,,137 
That Puerto Rico is still one of the "exotic territories" was con-
firmed in 1978 in Califano v. Torres,138 when the Supreme Court reiterat-
ed the Insular Cases' holding that Puerto Rico is an unincorporated 
territory of the United States. While living in the states, Cesar Gautier 
Torres, Carmelo Bracero Colon, and a third party identified by the Court 
only as "Vega," had received Supplemental Security Income through a 
135Id. at 8-9 (footnotes omitted). 
136 Justice Harlan was the grandson of Justice John Marshall Harlan who had 
eloquently dissented in Downes. See David Shultz, Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court 196-
97 (2005). 
137 Reid, 354 U.S. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
138 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam). 
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federal Social Security Administration program for "qualified aged, 
blind, and disabled persons."139 When they moved to Puerto Rico, howev-
er, their benefits were canceled. The Supreme Court let this discrimina-
tion stand, explaining: 
[t]he exclusion of Puerto Rico in the amended program is apparent 
in the definitional section. . .. [T]he Act ... states that no individu-
al is eligible for benefits during any month in which he or she is 
outside the United States. The Act defines "the United States" as 
"the 50 States and the District of Columbia. ,,140 
The Justices then concluded that "we deal here with a constitutional 
attack upon a law providing for governmental payments of monetary 
benefits." Such a statute "is entitled to a strong presumption of consti-
tutionality." As the Court explained, "So long as [the statute's] judg-
ments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle 
the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitution-
al strait jacket. ,,141 
The "rational basis" for Congress's action in this case was later 
described by the Court in Harris v. Rosario: "In [Califano], we conclud-
ed that a similar statutory classification was rationally grounded on 
three factors: Puerto Rican residents do not contribute to the federal 
treasury; the cost of treating Puerto Rico as a State under the statute 
would be high; and greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican 
economy."142 In ruling that the lower level of reimbursement provided to 
Puerto Rico under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program 
did not violate the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, Harris 
exposed Puerto Rico's continued unincorporated territorial status. Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall noted in his dissent that three of his contempo-
raries on the Court had expressed opposition to Downes and its denial of 
constitutional protections to U.S. citizens, but they did not join him 
here. Marshall concluded that Harris ultimately illustrated how the 
1391d. at 2. 
140ld. (citations omitted). 
1411d. at 5 (citations omitted) (quoting Mathews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976); 
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972)). See Malavet, supra note 18, at 155-58 
(describing the Puerto Rican economy generally, specifically identifying the Puerto Ricans 
as the poorest American citizens). 
142 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 652 (1980). Although Puerto Ricans do not pay 
federal income taxes, they do pay Social Security and other federal taxes, and additionally, 
it is difficult to conceive how $300 million for children's welfare would negatively disrupt 
the Puerto Rican economy. See Malavet, supra note 18, at 155-58 (discussing Puerto Rico's 
economy). 
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Insular Cases had become entrenched constitutional doctrine that ac-
corded some Americans second-class citizenship.143 
As of the writing of this chapter, the most recent reference to the 
Insular Cases can be found in Justice Clarence Thomas's concurring 
opinion in United States v. Lara144 in 2004. There, citing Reid, he wrote: 
"The 'Insular Cases,' which include the Hawai'i and Puerto Rico exam-
pies ... involved Territories of the United States, over which Congress 
has plenary power to govern and regulate.,,145 As long as the Insular 
Cases remain good law, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under 
the Territorial Clause, may unilaterally change the statutory relation-
ship between the United States and its territories. Moreover, one Con-
gress cannot bind another, which makes statutory language purporting 
to limit future legislative enactments unconstitutionaU46 
Attempts to create formal Puerto Rican citizenship have been legally 
and politically rebuffed. For example, in 1997, socialist Juan Mari-Bras 
renounced his U.S. citizenship, hoping to retain only Puerto Rican 
citizenship as his legal citizenship, and the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico held that Puerto Rican citizenship was independent of U.S. citizen-
ship because of certain provisions of Puerto Rican law.147 On the day 
before that opinion was issued, however, the Puerto Rican law alluded to 
in the opinion was amended to require both u.s. citizenship and Puerto 
Rico residency in order to become a citizen of the island, making the 
matter of law addressed in the opinion moot.148 As a result, Puerto 
Ricans are limited to the legal citizenship of the United States but they 
are not entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights usually associated 
with that citizenship. 
143 Harris, 446 U.S. at 653-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
144 Lara, 541 U.S. at 214 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
145 Id. at 225. 
146 See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 
733-34 (1986) (finding that the provisions of the 1985 balanced budget act, the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, requiring specific executive action to reduce the deficit violated 
constitutional separation of powers). 
147 Ramirez de Ferrer v. Mari Bras, 144 P.R. Dec. 141 (1997). Plaintiff Miriam 
Ramirez-de Ferrer is a pro-statehood activist who was a Puerto Rican senator. Juan Mari-
Bras is the founder of the Movimiento Pro Independencia and the Socialist Party of Puerto 
Rico. 
148 P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 1, § 7 (1997), amended by Law 132 of Nov. 17, 1997, § 1; see 
also Pedro Malavet Vega, Derechos y Libertades Constitucionales en Puerto Rico 589 n.1454 
(2003) (discussing the controversy that arose as a result of the rather curious timing of the 
amendment to the statute). 
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Downes' Legacy: Citizenship of a Second Class 
The most enduring effect of Downes is its definition of a diminished 
level of citizenship for territorial subjects of the United States.149 Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, in part: "All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens ofthe United States and of the State wherein they reside.,,150 
To the extent that this provision creates formal universal U.S. citizen-
ship, it is belied by the reality of that citizenship, which is often 
constructed on the basis of fault lines defined by essentialized notions of 
race. The territorial peoples are just one example of this citizenship 
construct, and one can easily include American Indians/51 Mrican Ameri-
cans/52 Asian Americans, and Mexican Americans153 among the victims.154 
The citizenship status of Puerto Ricans was left unclear at the end 
of the Spanish American War, when Article IX of the Treaty of Paris 
provided: 
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory 
over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her 
sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, 
retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the 
right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they 
shall also have the right to carryon their industry, commerce and 
professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are 
applicable to other foreigners. 
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of 
the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined 
by the Congress.155 
149 Until Puerto Ricans were granted U.s. citizenship in 1917, they were, in the words 
of a Democratic U.S. senator, "without a country." Still, under international law, Puerto 
Rican citizenship is not recognized. See Carr, supra note 30, at 36. 
150 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The section continues as follows: "No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." 
151 See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
152 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
153 As detailed by Guadalupe Luna, Mexicans were dispossessed of their land despite 
their formal U.S. citizenship and their legal rights. Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/Chicano 
Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a "Naked Knife," 4 Mich. J. of Race 
& L. 39 (1998); see also Race and Races, supra note 46, at 262. 
154 To this limited study, we might add the mistreatment of Native Hawaiians. See Eric 
K. Yamamoto, Carrie Ann Y. Shirota & Jayna Kanani Kim, Indigenous Peoples' Human 
Rights in U.S. Courts, in Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology 300 (Berta Esperanza 
Hermmdez-Truyol ed., 2002). 
155 Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, T.S. No. 343, reprinted in P.R. 
Laws Ann., vol. 1,20 (emphasis added). 
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Although the peninsulares (natives of the Iberian Peninsula) were given 
the option to retain their Spanish citizenship, the native-born Puerto 
Ricans were not. They lost the Spanish citizenship they had been 
granted in late 1897. Yet again, the island's native inhabitants became 
subjects, but not citizens, of a colonial power. Despite the language of the 
treaty, until Congress acted on the matter, the legal citizenship of 
Puerto Rico's non-Spanish inhabitants was defined by the U.S. courts, 
initially and enduringly, in Downes. Downes effectively defined the legal 
rights of the inhabitants of the territories of the United States, as well as 
the power of the federal executive and legislative branches to regulate 
the land and its people. 
Two decades later, in Balzac v. Porto Rico/56 the Supreme Court, in 
adopting the incorporated/unincorporated territories categories created 
by White, constitutionally constructed the U.S. citizenship of Puerto 
Ricans as second class as long as they remained in the territory of Puerto 
Rico. The Court distinguished between the rights of U.S. citizens living 
in Puerto Rico and those of U.S. citizens living in "the United States 
proper." As long as Puerto Ricans chose to remain on the island, they 
would enjoy the formal status but not the full rights of American 
citizenship. Balzac thus distinguished between Puerto Ricans as individ-
ual U.S. citizens and Puerto Ricans as collective inhabitants of Puerto 
Rico. As individuals, they were free "to enjoy all political and other 
rights" granted to U.S. citizens if they "move[d] into the United States 
proper," but as long as they remained on the island, they could not fully 
enjoy the rights of U.S. citizenship.157 The Court explained the motiva-
tion behind this construction of Puerto Rican second-class citizenship in 
nativistic terms when it distinguished the island from Alaska: 
Alaska was a very different case from that of Porto Rico. It was an 
enormous territory, very sparsely settled and offering opportunity 
for immigration and settlement by American citizens. It was on the 
American Continent and within easy reach of the then United 
States. It involved none of the difficulties which incorporation of the 
Philippines and Porto Rico presents.158 
This statement clearly assumes that Puerto Rican U.S. citizens are 
not the "American citizens" who could resettle an "American" state. 
While recognizing the impossibility of creating an Anglo-Saxon majority 
in Puerto Rico, the Court also constructed Puerto Ricans as "others." 
Because Puerto Ricans are so "other," the incorporation of the territory 
into the United States could not be inferred; it had to be clearly 
156 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
157Id. at 311. 
158Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
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expressed by Congress.159 To this day, Congress has not expressed itself 
on the matter of incorporation and full extension of constitutional 
guarantees to Puerto Rico. 
Conclusion: Forgotten Cases and Invisible Citizens 
The Fuller Court is often remembered in law schools for invalidating 
the first national income tax160 and declaring a state law prohibiting 
more than sixty hours in a work-week unconstitutional,l6l but its most 
famous case is Plessy v. Ferguson.162 With the exception of Justice 
McKenna, who was appointed in January of 1898,163 all the members of 
the Downes Court were members of the Court that decided the notorious 
Plessy in 1896-a decision in which Justice Brewer did not participate 
and Justice Harlan dissented.164 But while the "separate but equal" 
standard of Plessy was relegated to the historical trash bin by Brown v. 
Board of Education,165 the Downes decision is still good law. By relieving 
159 Again, the Supreme Court is rather clear in Balzac: 
The jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of the responsibilities of jurors 
. .. Congress has thought that a people like the Filipinos or the Porto Ricans, trained 
to a complete judicial system which knows no juries, living in compact and ancient 
communities, with defInitely formed customs and political conceptions, should be 
permitted themselves to determine how far they wish to adopt this institution of 
Anglo-Saxon origin, and when. 
Id. at 310. 
160 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), superseded by U.S. 
Const. amend XVI. 
161 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York penal statute 
forbidding employers from requiring workers to exceed sixty hours in a work week). 
162 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (7-1 decision). 
163 See 3 The Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: Their Lives and Major 
Opinions 861 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) [hereinafter Justices of the 
Supreme Court]. 
164 J. Gordon Hylton explains why Justice Brewer did not participate in the decision: 
The fmal line of the United States Supreme Court opinion in the landmark case of 
Plessy v. Ferguson states, "Mr. Justice Brewer did not hear the argument or partici-
pate in the decision of this case." Because of the untimely death of his daughter, the 
58-year old Justice had been forced to leave Washington, D.C. for his home in 
Leavenworth, Kansas, on April 13, 1896, the day Plessy was argued before the Court. 
Without Brewer, the Court voted 7 to 1 to uphold Louisiana's "separate but equal" 
public accommodations law. Only Justice John Marshall Harlan, a former slaveholder 
from Kentucky, agreed that the challenged "Jim Crow" statute violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice David Brewer 
and the Problem of Race, 61 Miss. L.J. 315, 315-16 (1991) (footnotes omitted). 
165 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Congress and the President of most constitutional limitations on the 
exercise of their discretion, the Supreme Court in Downes intended to 
allow the government some flexibility in dealing with new territorial 
possessions. But that flexibility has now become a permanent system for 
the regulation of an island empire, rather than a transitional process as 
it was for Cuba and even the Philippines. 
The late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in his book The 
Supreme Court,166 discussed why President Theodore Roosevelt had de-
manded to know how Oliver Wendell Holmes would vote on the Insular 
Cases before nominating him to replace the retiring Horace Gray on the 
Supreme Court. In a letter to Holmes' sponsor, Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Roosevelt wrote: 
The majority of the present Court who have, although without 
satisfactory unanimity, upheld the policies of President McKinley 
and the Republican party in Congress, have rendered a great service 
to mankind and to this nation. The minority-a minority so large as 
to lack but one vote of being a majority-have stood for such 
reactionary folly as would have hampered well-nigh hopelessly this 
people in doing efficient and honorable work for the national wel-
fare, and for the welfare of the islands themselves, in Porto Rico and 
the Philippines. No doubt they have possessed excellent motives and 
without doubt they are men of excellent personal character; but this 
no more excuses them than the same conditions excused the various 
upright and honorable men who took part in the wicked folly of 
secession in 1860 and 186l. 
Now I should like to know that Judge Holmes was in entire 
sympathy with our views [on the Insular Casesp67 
Rehnquist then concluded that "Holmes was duly appointed an associate 
justice [effective December 8, 1902168], and largely fulfilled Roosevelt's 
expectations of him with respect to the so-called Insular Cases, which 
were a great issue at that time, although they are scarcely a footnote in a 
text on constitutional law today.,,169 
The late Chief Justice is, of course, correct that Downes and the 
Insular Cases are treated as a legal footnote. But they should not be. As 
President Roosevelt's litmus test for appointment of one of the best-
166 William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 215-17 (new ed. 2001). 
167 Id. at 216. 
168 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 163, at 878. 
169 Rehnquist, supra note 166, at 217. Justice Holmes acquiesced in the continued 
imposition of the White doctrine in the Insular Cases, but did not expressly embrace it. 
Accordingly, he concurred in the result in Balzac, but without a written opinion. 258 U.S. 
298, 314 (1922). 
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remembered Justices in history indicates, these decisions were critical to 
the determination of the kind of country that the United States was to 
become. Moreover, Downes is living constitutional doctrine dailyaffect-
ing the lives of millions of Puerto Ricans who are relegated to second-
class citizenship and leaving a United States territory in a permanent 
state of constitutional uncertainty about its future. The Insular Cases 
are indeed the enduring legacy of the Fuller Court and an essential part 
of the legal development of our nation. Downes v. Bidwell constitutional-
ly defines the nation that we are. If we study it seriously, rather than 
relegating it to legal obscurity, we might become the nation that we wish 
to be. 
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